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Abstract
We construct probability forecasts for episodes of price deﬂation (i.e., a falling price level)
using yields on nominal and real U.S. Treasury bonds. The deﬂation probability forecasts
identify two “deﬂation scares” during the past decade: a mild one following the 2001
recession, and a more serious one starting in late 2008 with the deepening of the ﬁnancial
crisis. The estimated deﬂation probabilities are generally consistent with those from
macroeconomic models and surveys of professional forecasters, but they also provide high-
frequency insight into the views of ﬁnancial market participants. The probabilities can
also be used to price the deﬂation option embedded in real Treasury bonds.
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discussant James Wilcox. We thank James Gillan and Justin Weidner for excellent research assistance. The
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views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
This version: February 15, 2011.1 Introduction
Throughout much of the postwar period, as overall price levels rose fairly rapidly in many
countries, central banks were concerned with reducing price inﬂation in order to achieve their
mandate for price stability. However, in recent years, as inﬂation rates around the world
have fallen to much lower levels, the risks to price stability have become more symmetric,
and fears that inﬂation may fall too low have emerged. In particular, the risk of negative
inﬂation—price deﬂation—has become a recurring concern for several central banks.1 Most
seriously, Japan has been mired in deﬂation and economic stagnation since the mid-1990s.
Among Federal Reserve policymakers, worries about deﬂation surfaced twice during the
past decade. The ﬁrst episode followed the 2001 recession. Notably, the Federal Open Market
Committee’s (FOMC) statement of May 6, 2003 publicly expressed the possibility of an
“unwelcome substantial fall in inﬂation.” Then Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke
(2003) highlighted the importance of this statement, noting that “[t]he May 6 statement broke
new ground as the ﬁrst occasion in which the FOMC expressed the concern that inﬂation
might actually fall too low.” The second period of deﬂationary worries began during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis and ensuing recession. In the wake of a deepening worldwide ﬁnancial
upheaval in late 2008, projections of a slowing economy and possible price deﬂation were
key drivers of monetary policy. Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2010) described the
motivation for policy actions during the crisis in this way: “[T]he FOMC’s policy response
also reﬂected concerns about a possible unwelcome decline in inﬂation. Taking note of the
painful experience of Japan, policymakers worried that the United States might sink into
deﬂation and that, as one consequence, the FOMC’s target interest rate might hit its zero
lower bound, limiting the scope for further monetary accommodation.”
The desire to avoid deﬂation is often based on the view that a deﬂationary episode is
particularly treacherous. Early on, Bernanke (2003) stressed the pernicious eﬀects of deﬂa-
tion: “In any case, I hope we can agree that a substantial fall in inﬂation at this stage has
the potential to interfere with the ongoing U.S. recovery, and that in conceivable—although
remote—circumstances, a serious deﬂation would do signiﬁcant economic harm.” Deﬂation-
ary episodes are considered especially worrying because they may have their own unique and
painful dynamics. The continuing deﬂationary travails of Japan illustrate the possibility that
the interaction of price deﬂation with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates may
produce an intractable regime that is diﬃcult to exit. Even worse, some theoretical models
1See Bordo and Filardo (2005) and Kumar et al. (2003) for historical and cross-county surveys of deﬂa-
tionary episodes.
1suggest that a reinforcing and escalating “deﬂationary spiral” could arise at the zero bound,
in which the fall in prices boosts real interest rates and vice versa. In addition, deﬂations also
may carry particularly severe social costs related to the increased real burden on borrowers
with ﬁxed nominal debts. If deﬂations are special regimes that have their own unique dy-
namics or social costs, it would be particularly useful to go beyond point forecasts of inﬂation
and consider probability forecasts for the occurrence of a deﬂationary episode.2
Given the special interest in periods of price deﬂation, we examine probability forecasts for
such episodes. Of course, there are a variety of ways in which deﬂation probability forecasts
could be constructed. In this paper, we focus on high-frequency probability forecasts that are
derived from yields on nominal and real Treasury bonds. While nominal Treasury bonds have
ﬁxed coupons and principal, real Treasury bonds—or Treasury inﬂation-protected securities
(TIPS)—have coupons and principal that vary with changes in the headline consumer price
index (CPI). Diﬀerences between comparable-maturity nominal and real yields are widely
used as readings on the inﬂation expectations of market participants; however, such readings
are obscured by ﬂuctuations in the compensation for inﬂation risk. To disentangle inﬂation
expectations and risk premiums, Christensen et al. (2010), henceforth CLR, use an aﬃne,
arbitrage-free dynamic term structure of nominal and real yields.3 In this paper, we show how
to use such a dynamic term structure model to calculate the entire probability distribution
of future inﬂation outcomes—particularly, the implied deﬂation probability forecasts—at any
forecast horizon.
Our deﬂation probability forecasts estimated from yield curves align well with the re-
sults from simple macroeconomic benchmarks, surveys of professional forecasters, and other
ﬁnancial market prices. These comparisons provide some assurance that our “yields-only” ap-
proach provides useful deﬂation probabilities under the “real-world” pricing measure needed
for macroeconomic policy analysis and risk management (as opposed to just the “risk-neutral”
pricing measure). Furthermore, we demonstrate how the deﬂation probability forecasts can
be used to value the deﬂation protection option embedded in TIPS bonds exploiting the AF
property of the model.4 Our results show that the model-implied value of the embedded de-
2Similar arguments have long been used to motivate the widespread focus on recession probability fore-
casts. That is, since recessions are exceptional episodes or regimes worthy of special attention, it is useful to
consider event probabilities instead of just point forecasts of future growth (e.g., Diebold and Rudebusch 1989,
Rudebusch and Williams 2009).
3Arbitrage-free (AF) models specify the risk-neutral evolution of the underlying yield-curve factors as well
as the dynamics of risk premiums under the key theoretical restriction that there are no residual opportunities
for riskless arbitrage across maturities and over time. Note that these models provide pricing information
under both the risk-neutral and observed (or “real-world”) pricing measures.
4To the best of our knowledge, Grishchenko et al. (2010) is the only other paper to explicitly address the
valuation of the deﬂation protection embedded in TIPS bonds within a dynamic term structure model.
2ﬂation protection is highly correlated with the observed price diﬀerence between TIPS bonds
of similar remaining maturities but diﬀerent degrees of accumulated inﬂation exposure.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the AF model and describes how
deﬂation probability forecasts are obtained from a full-sample model estimate (i.e., in-sample
ﬁtted values) and from real-time model estimates based on expanding samples (i.e., out-of-
sample forecasts). The resulting deﬂation probabilities suggest that over the past decade two
“deﬂation scares” occurred: a mild one following the 2001 recession, and a more serious one
that started in the autumn of 2008 after the deepening of the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis. In
Section 3, we compare our real-time deﬂation probability forecasts based on Treasury yields to
a variety of alternative forecasts from macroeconomic models and surveys. These alternative
forecasts are roughly in line with our estimates, but their low frequency makes them less
useful as indicators of future deﬂation in real time. In Section 4, we compare our real-time
forecasts to alternatives in the ﬁnance literature that are based on yield diﬀerentials between
seasoned and newly-issued TIPS. These alternative measures contain no correction for risk
premiums and are thus expressed in risk-neutral pricing terms. Using an AF model, we can
generate similar deﬂation probabilities under the risk-neutral pricing measure; however, our
focus is on deﬂation probabilities under the alternative “real-world” pricing measure, which
is more relevant for macroeconomic policy and risk management. Indeed, Section 5 provides
a salient example of the model’s asset pricing applications by valuing the deﬂation protection
option embedded in the principal payments of TIPS bonds.
2 Deﬂation Probabilities from a Term Structure Model
A dynamic term structure model can be used to decompose diﬀerences between nominal
and real yield curves into market-implied inﬂation expectations and inﬂation risk premiums
at various maturities. Such models can also provide information on the full distribution of
expected inﬂation outcomes. In this section, we summarize the CLR version of such a model
and explain how to obtain the implied deﬂation probabilities.
2.1 CLR Model Speciﬁcation
Aﬃne, arbitrage-free term structure models, of which the CLR model is an example, link
yield curve dynamics and investor risk premiums within a consistent framework that can
produce both risk-neutral and real-world representations of yield curves over time. Denote
the nominal and real stochastic discount factors as MN
t and MR
t , respectively. The price of a
3nominal bond that pays one dollar at time τ and the price of a real bond that pays one unit
of the consumption basket at time τ are written as
PN


















The no-arbitrage condition requires a consistency between the prices of nominal and real
bonds such that the price of the consumption basket, denoted as the overall price level Qt, is







As derived in CLR, the relationship between nominal and real zero-coupon yields with
maturity τ at time t, denoted as yN
t (τ) and yR
t (τ), and expected inﬂation is
yN
t (τ) = yR
t (τ) + πe
t(τ) + φt(τ),


























t are the instantaneous nominal and real risk-free rates. The corresponding


































The CLR model is a four-factor version of the arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel (AFNS) rep-
resentation developed by Christensen et al. (CDR, 2010). The ﬁrst three factors correspond
to the level, slope and curvature factors commonly observed for nominal yields and denoted
LN
t , St, and Ct, respectively. The fourth factor, LR
t , corresponds to the level factor for real
yields. The state vector is thus deﬁned as Xt = (LN
t ,St,Ct,LR
t ). The instantaneous nominal







4where the diﬀerential scaling of real rates to the common slope factor is captured by the
parameter αR. Within this framework, nominal Treasury zero-coupon bond yields are denoted
as
yN
















where AN(τ)/τ is a nominal yield-adjustment term. The real TIPS zero-coupon bond yields
are
yR
















where AR(τ)/τ is a real yield-adjustment term. These two equations when combined in
state-space form constitute the measurement equation within our Kalman ﬁlter estimation.
To complete the model, we deﬁne the price of risk, which determines the connection
between the risk-neutral and real-world yield dynamics. We assume that the nominal and real
stochastic discount factors have standard dynamics given by dMN
t /MN
t = −rN






t dt − Γ′
tdWP
t , where WP
t is a Brownian motion process. We use the
essentially aﬃne risk premium speciﬁcation introduced by Duﬀee (2002), so the risk premium





with Γt = γ0 + γ1Xt, γ0 ∈ R4, and γ1 ∈ R4×4. Therefore, the real-world dynamics of the
state variables can be expressed as
dXt = KP(θP − Xt)dt + ΣdWP
t . (3)
In the unrestricted case, both KP and θP are allowed to vary freely, but CLR provide a de-
tailed empirical analysis to justify various zero-value restrictions on the KP matrix. Imposing


























































































































5where the covariance matrix Σ is assumed diagonal and constant. This is the transition
equation in our Kalman ﬁlter estimation.
2.2 Calculation of Deﬂation Probabilities
Using the CLR model, we can examine whether the change in the price index (i.e., the inﬂation







s )ds ≤ (1 + q).










s )ds ≤ ln(1 + q).









Y (t,τ) and σP
Y (τ)2 are the distribution’s conditional mean and variance, respectively,
under the real-world probability measure.5 The probability of the change in the price index




































2.3 Full-Sample Deﬂation Probability Estimates
We start with a full-sample examination of the model and its ﬁtted (or in-sample) deﬂation
probabilities. For this estimation, we use nominal Treasury zero-coupon bond yields with
maturities of 3 and 6 months, and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years from January 3, 1995 to
December 7, 2010, for a total of 3,978 daily observations. We also use real TIPS bond yields
with maturities of 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 years from January 4, 1999, to December 7, 2010,
for a total of daily 2,980 observations.6 The U.S. Treasury ﬁrst issued TIPS in 1997, but
5Risk-neutral inﬂation probabilities are readily obtained by replacing the real-world dynamics of the state
variables with their risk-neutral dynamics.
6The data are described in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2007, 2010) and are available from the Board of Governors





 ,4 θP Σ
KP
1,  0.5999 0 0 -0.3719 0.0614 Σ1,1 0.0052
(0.2539) (0.2157) (0.0039) (0.0001)
KP
2,  1.1921 0.6820 -0.6698 0 -0.0288 Σ2,2 0.0082
(0.3873) (0.1561) (0.1055) (0.0105) (0.0001)
KP
3,  0 0 0.6070 0 -0.0215 Σ3,3 0.0324
(0.2584) (0.0094) (0.0002)
KP
4,  -3.2348 -0.5551 0 2.3674 0.0340 Σ4,4 0.0063
(0.4303) (0.1213) (0.3198) (0.0047) (0.0001)
Table 1: Parameter Estimates for the Preferred Speciﬁcation of the CLR Model.
The estimated parameters of the KP matrix, θP vector, and diagonal Σ matrix are shown for the
preferred speciﬁcation of the CLR model. The estimated value of λ is 0.4925 (0.0015), while αR is
estimated to be 0.5323 (0.0017). The numbers in parentheses are the estimated parameter standard
deviations. The maximum log likelihood value is 298,501.8.
for several years afterward, the liquidity of the secondary TIPS market was impaired by the
small amount of securities outstanding and uncertainty about the Treasury’s commitment to
the program. Indeed, to avoid the illiquid nascent years of this market, CLR began their
estimation sample of TIPS yields in 2003. Here, in order to shed some light on deﬂation
probabilities early in the 2000s, we start our sample of TIPS data earlier, which does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect our later conclusions.
Table 1 presents the estimated parameters of the preferred CLR model speciﬁcation over
the full sample. The estimates are comparable to those given in CLR for a shorter sample of
weekly data. In particular, the oﬀ-diagonal elements in the estimated KP matrix are highly
statistically signiﬁcant except for κP
14, which has seen its signiﬁcance decline since the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis. However, a robustness check indicates that this parameter has a negligible
eﬀect on the ﬁtted, in-sample deﬂation probabilities, therefore we proceed with the preferred
CLR speciﬁcation throughout the paper.
Figure 1 shows our full sample estimates of the one-year probability of deﬂation (i.e., q = 0
and τ equals one year). Using a rough benchmark of a probability greater than ﬁve percent,
two “deﬂation scare” episodes stand out. Outside these two periods of elevated deﬂation risk,
the estimated deﬂation probability is eﬀectively zero.
Figure 2 puts the two deﬂation scares into sharper focus along with grey shading to
indicate recessions. Both episodes were preceded by recessions, but in each case, the risk
of deﬂation persisted long after the recessions ended. The ﬁrst episode spans September
2001 through December 2003. During this period, as noted in the introduction, the FOMC
yields are based on both on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run TIPS bonds.






























Figure 1: In-Sample One-Year Deﬂation Probabilities.
Illustration of the probability of non-positive net inﬂation (or deﬂation) over the forthcoming year as
estimated by the CLR model over the full sample period.
expressed concern for the ﬁrst time that inﬂation might fall too low. The one-year market-
implied deﬂation probability averaged 3.0% over this period, reaching highs of over 25% in
August 2002 and August 2003. During this 28-month period, negative month-to-month values
for headline CPI inﬂation were recorded six times. The second deﬂation scare episode begins
shortly after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 and runs through April
2010. This episode is marked by a sharp spike in the ﬁtted, one-year deﬂation probabilities up
to near certainty in late October and early November 2008. In response to concerns of a very
severe and rapid economic collapse, the Federal Reserve enacted a variety of conventional
and unconventional monetary and liquidity policy actions, which likely helped reduce the
probabilities in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 to an average of 4.3% with temporary spikes up to
15 percent. The model’s one-year-ahead deﬂation probabilities averaged 5.3% over the course
of 2009. The probabilities averaged 2.6% for the dataset in 2010 and dipped below 5% in
April. Over this 20 month period, seven months registered negative, month-to-month values
for headline CPI with annualized values of more than -10% in October and November 2008.
The very high deﬂation probabilities immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy certainly
reﬂect the widespread fear of a resulting global macroeconomic free fall, but they are also likely




























































(a) First deﬂation scare.
































































(b) Second deﬂation scare.
Figure 2: In-Sample Deﬂation Probabilities over the Deﬁned Deﬂation Scares.
Illustration of the ﬁtted, in-sample one-year deﬂation probabilities from the preferred speciﬁcation of
the CLR model over the deﬁned deﬂation scares (i.e., probability > 5%). Shown in grey shading are
recessions as determined by the NBER.
boosted by market illiquidity during the ﬁnancial crisis. Several asset classes faced impaired
liquidity during the fall of 2008 with widening bid-ask spreads, lower trading volumes, and
concurrent increases in yields. The jump in risk aversion also helped create a heightened
global demand for safe assets, and this “ﬂight-to-quality” (or “safe haven”) demand favored
highly liquid nominal Treasury securities and led to a sharp decline in their yields, while real
yields declined by less. Liquidity in the TIPS market was especially hard hit (see Campbell et
al. 2009 and CLR for detailed discussions), which lead to higher real yields and a narrowing
of spreads to nominal Treasuries. The model’s deﬂation probabilities are certainly boosted
during the last few months of 2008 due to these liquidity events, but this volatile period of
very high deﬂation probabilities appears to have been relatively short in nature.
2.4 Real-time Deﬂation Probability Forecasts
In order to generate deﬂation forecast probabilities that would be relevant to market par-
ticipants and policymakers in real time, we complement our ﬁtted, in-sample estimates with
deﬂation probabilities based on expanding-sample model estimations. In particular, we re-
estimate the preferred speciﬁcation of the model using weekly data with end of sample dates
from January 7, 2005 to December 3, 2010, a total of 309 estimations.7 We start this analysis
7That is, starting with the ﬁrst week of January 2005, each new weekly observation is included in the
sample, and the model is re-estimated. Note that the shift to weekly data from daily data had little eﬀect on













































Full sample estimate    
Real time estimate     
Figure 3: Real-Time, One-Year Probability Forecasts of Deﬂation.
Illustration of the real-time, out-of-sample probabilities of non-positive net inﬂation (i.e., deﬂation)
over the following year as estimated by the CLR model. Included are the corresponding estimates
from the full sample estimation.
in 2005 in order to provide a minimum sample size for accurate estimation and thus cannot
examine the earlier deﬂation episode in this manner.
Figure 3 shows that inference based on the two sets of default probabilities does not change
qualitatively. To provide further context for these deﬂation probability forecasts, Figure 4
examines the ability of the model’s point estimates of one-year-ahead expected inﬂation to
track actually observed inﬂation rates. In Figure 4(a), we graph these expectations relative to
the corresponding observed year-over-year changes in headline CPI, which is the index used for
TIPS bonds. Note that the model does well at predicting deﬂation in 2009 as headline CPI in
May 2009 was 2.1 percent below its level the year before. However, the model does not capture
the volatile short-term variation in headline CPI. Such volatility is driven by ﬂuctuations in
crude food and energy prices which are notoriously diﬃcult to forecast. Therefore, in Figure
4(b), we compare the model’s one-year inﬂation expectations to the observed year-over-year
changes in the less volatile core CPI series. The model tracks these changes remarkably well
using both estimation samples. Thus, the model and its deﬂation probabilities may be useful
tools for real-time macroeconomic policy or historical analysis.
our analysis but speeded the re-estimation process.




































Full sample estimate     
Real time estimate       
Change in headline CPI     
(a) Comparison to headline CPI inﬂation.










































Full sample estimate     
Real time estimate       
Change in core CPI     
(b) Comparison to core CPI inﬂation.
Figure 4: Real-Time, One-Year Inﬂation Forecasts.
Illustration of the real-time estimates of the one-year inﬂations expectations from the CLR model.
Included are the corresponding estimates from the full sample estimation as well as the subsequent
year-over-year change in headline and core CPI, respectively.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the model’s forecasts of both headline and core CPI
one and two years ahead from both the full-sample and the real-time analysis and compares its
performance to that of the random walk. In general, under the root-mean-squared-error loss
function, the model is able to beat the random walk at forecasting headline CPI, and is not
that far behind when it comes to forecasting changes in the more stable core CPI. During this
sample period, the model generally underestimated realized inﬂation. Bond investors likely
underestimated the persistent increases in energy prices from 2003 to mid-2008. In addition,
at times, TIPS yields were likely artiﬁcially elevated due to liquidity premiums, which would
translate into low BEI rates and, presumably, correspondingly low model inﬂation forecasts.
3 Forecasts from Macroeconomic Models and Surveys
In this section, we compare the deﬂation probability forecasts from the CLR yields-only model
to those obtained from simple macroeconomic models and from professional forecasters. One
source for deﬂation probabilities is the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
which provides point forecasts for CPI inﬂation over the next four quarters. These forecasts
can be used to generate implied SPF deﬂation probability forecasts based on the distribution
of past SPF forecast errors. Speciﬁcally, the SPF probability forecast in a particular quarter
11Full sample analysis, 1999-2010
One-year forecast Two-year forecast Headline CPI
Mean RMSE Mean RMSE
Random walk 3.96 212.12 22.66 130.53
CLR model -105.97 167.43 -97.23 139.72
One-year forecast Two-year forecast Core CPI
Mean RMSE Mean RMSE
Random walk 9.32 55.87 10.32 59.27
CLR model -64.64 87.08 -59.83 82.64
Real-time analysis, 2005-2010
One-year forecast Two-year forecast Headline CPI
Mean RMSE Mean RMSE
Random walk 32.60 288.81 99.50 167.30
CLR model -50.27 173.87 -12.18 106.58
One-year forecast Two-year forecast Core CPI
Mean RMSE Mean RMSE
Random walk 22.56 55.80 22.71 58.61
CLR model -24.17 63.54 2.69 58.16
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Inﬂation Forecast Errors.
The summary statistics for the forecast errors from the random walk and the CLR models in
forecasting both headline and core CPI inﬂation one and two years ahead. The top panel is
based on the full sample estimate generating 131 and 119 monthly forecast errors from the
end of January 1999 until the end of November 2009 and November 2008, respectively. The
bottom panel is based on the real-time analysis which generates 59 and 47 monthly forecast
errors from the end of January 2005 until the end of November 2009 and November 2008,
respectively. All numbers are measured in basis points.
assumes a normal distribution of outcomes around the point forecast with a variance equal
to that of SPF CPI forecast errors from 1981:Q1—the ﬁrst quarter of SPF CPI forecasts —
up to that particular quarter. Rudebusch and Williams (2009) apply a similar methodology
to obtain implied SPF recession probability forecasts and show that they correspond quite
closely with the subjective recession probabilities, that are reported in the SPF.8 The SPF
inﬂation forecasts and implied deﬂation probability forecasts are shown in Figures 5 and 6,
respectively.
It is also of interest to compare our yields-only deﬂation probabilities to those generated
8The SPF has long asked participants to report inﬂation forecast probability distributions; unfortunately,
this direct subjective assessment refers to gross domestic product (GDP) price inﬂation on a calendar year
average over calendar year average basis rather than the one-year-ahead CPI percent change relevant for the
TIPS-based probabilities. (Since 2007, the SPF has also reported subjective probabilities for core CPI inﬂation
on a calendar year basis.) To the extent they are comparable across their diﬀering price indexes, the reported
SPF deﬂation probabilities appear to be consistent with our model-implied deﬂation probabilities.





























SPF (CPI)  
Random walk (CPI)   
Phillips curve (core CPI)   
CLR model     
Figure 5: CPI and Core CPI Inﬂation Forecasts.
See main text for the description of the various inﬂation forecasts.
from models of inﬂation. From the vast macroeconomic literature, we consider two simple
real-time, macroeconomic benchmarks using data and analysis that arguably were available
to forecasters contemporaneously—that is, in the early to mid 2000s. The ﬁrst model employs
a random walk forecast of the kind recommended by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001); that is, at
each point in time, inﬂation over the next year is projected to be the same as it was over the
past year. The second model is a simple Phillips curve along the lines considered by Stock and
Watson (1999) as well as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) in which inﬂation depends on lagged
inﬂation and inversely on the degree of slack. For this purpose, we simply regress the one-
quarter-ahead core CPI inﬂation on four lags of itself and one lag of the unemployment rate
over the sample 1984:Q1 to 1999:Q4.9 Each quarter from 2000 through 2010, this equation
is iterated ahead (using SPF real-time forecasts for unemployment) to produce four-quarter-
ahead inﬂation forecasts. Probability forecasts from these models also require a distribution
of likely outcomes. After the mid 1980s, U.S. output growth and inﬂation exhibited much
less volatility than before, as detailed by Stock and Watson (2007). Therefore, like our SPF
implicit forecast distribution, we assume a normal distribution of outcomes around the point
9Given the short available samples, simple Phillips curves do not yield satisfactory estimates with headline
CPI. Williams (2009) estimates a similar model using the core PCE price index and gets broadly similar
probabilities.

















































SPF (CPI)    
Random walk (CPI)     
Phillips curve (core CPI)     
CLR model       
Figure 6: Probability Forecasts of of CPI and Core CPI Deﬂation.
See main text for the description of the various deﬂation probability forecasts.
forecast with a variance equal to that of the Phillips curve CPI forecast errors after 1984. The
point inﬂation forecasts and resulting deﬂation probability forecasts are shown in Figures 5
and 6, respectively.
Figures 5 and 6 also show the CLR model’s inﬂation forecasts and deﬂation probabilities
for comparison. During the second half of the sample, the one-year-ahead CLR inﬂation
forecasts are generally consistent with the macroeconomic models and survey results. The
divergence seen in the ﬁrst few years of the sample can most likely be attributed to the TIPS
liquidity issues discussed earlier, which raised TIPS yields and reduced inﬂation forecasts.
The deﬂation probabilities in Figure 6 are also generally consistent with each other in that
two deﬂationary episodes are identiﬁed following the 2001 recession and the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. During other periods, all of the deﬂation probabilities
are close to zero. During 2010, the various deﬂation probability forecasts have the largest dif-
ferences, which is consistent with the recent heightened uncertainty about the future direction
of inﬂation (e.g., Leduc, Rudebusch, and Weidner, 2009).
In summary, the deﬂationary episodes identiﬁed with the CLR model have rough parallels
with those from macroeconomic models and survey forecasts, supporting the suggestion that
the yields-only approach encompasses macroeconomic data quite well, even during the recent
14crisis.
4 Alternative Forecasts from Financial Market Data
Alternative yields-only approaches for generating deﬂation probabilities have been examined
in a few recent studies. With respect to U.S. data, Sack (2000) showed how to generate
a proxy for inﬂation expectations based on TIPS yields and a similar portfolio of Treasury
STRIPS. The author assumed that risk-neutral investors arbitrage away diﬀerences between
the payment structure of a real TIPS security (i.e., both coupons and principal) and a portfolio
of nominal Treasury STRIPS that has the same payment schedule. The market-implied
inﬂation compensation measure is the constant rate of inﬂation over the maturity of the
portfolio that equates the prices of the TIPS security and the matching STRIPS portfolio.
Higgins (2010) extended this analysis by assuming that investors believe that the inﬂation
process has a Gaussian distribution with a constant mean and variance. Once the model’s
parameters are estimated, the probability of deﬂation over the maturity of the investment,
which was ﬁve years in his analysis, can be generated as the integral over the appropriate
interval of the inﬂation process.
Wright (2009) proposed an alternative, risk-neutral yields-only approach that is based
on comparing the yields on a pair of TIPS securities that have comparable maturity dates
but diﬀerent issuance dates and thus diﬀerent reference CPI rates; see Section 5 for further
discussion of speciﬁc TIPS bond pairs. The intuition here is to take advantage of the market
pricing of the deﬂation protection options with diﬀerent strike prices that are embedded in
the two TIPS bonds; i.e., the contractual feature that insures that the principal repayment
cannot be less than the face value of the bond. Based on the proposed Wright (2009) approach,
a lower bound on the implied, risk-neutral deﬂation probability can be calculated over the
period up to the maturity of the bonds.
Figure 7 shows our full-sample and real-time ﬁve-year deﬂation probabilities under the
risk-neutral pricing measure. These deﬂation probabilities follow the same qualitative pattern
as the one-year, real-world probabilities presented in Figures 1 and 2; that is, they rise sharply
after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 and then decline in light of the various policy
actions taken by the Federal Reserve and other central banks over the course of the ﬁnancial
crisis. However, the risk-neutral probabilities are generally more persistent, and their decline
through 2009 and 2010 is slower than that typically exhibited by real-world probabilities.
The diﬀerences between the two sets of deﬂation probabilities, especially during the ﬁnancial
crisis, underscores the usefulness of a dynamic term structure model that allows us to generate




























































































Model−based real−world    
Model−based risk−neutral     
Higgins (2010) estimate    
Wright (2009) lower bound    
Figure 7: Five-Year-Ahead Deﬂation Probability Forecasts.
Illustration of the real-time probability forecasts of non-positive net inﬂation (i.e., deﬂation) under
both the real-world (or P) probability measure and the risk-neutral (or Q) pricing measure over the
following ﬁve years as estimated by the CLR model. Included are two alternative measures. The one
following Higgins (2010) is only available since April 27, 2010. The other is our application of the lower
bound calculation described in Wright (2009) to the pairs of comparable TIPS analyzed in Section 5.
and analyze both of them.
In comparing our estimates to the existing alternatives described previously, we note that,
with few exceptions, our real-time risk-neutral estimates are above the Wright lower bound,
but typically close to it.10 On the other hand, our estimates are well below those reported
by Higgins (2010). Based on these results, we conclude that the CLR model produces very
reasonable estimates of the deﬂation probability under the risk-neutral pricing measure, which
is in line with the model’s ability to ﬁt the cross sections of nominal and real yields very well.
As discussed in Section 2.3, all yields-only approaches are vulnerable to changes in liquidity
premiums in the Treasury markets that could distort the market pricing mechanism. In this
regard, the Wright procedure has the advantage of not depending on diﬀerential liquidity
premiums across the nominal and real Treasury markets, although liquidity issues may remain
10Maturity mismatches likely account for most violations since our estimates have constant ﬁve-year matu-
rities, while the Wright measure varies with the maturity of the underlying TIPS bonds.
16across diﬀerent TIPS bonds. Although these distortions directly aﬀect the model-implied
deﬂation probabilities, we are comfortable with the CLR model’s ability to smooth through
the recent excess volatility and capture the underlying trends in the data.
The most important shortcoming of the alternative yields-only approaches is that they
only provide deﬂation probabilities under the risk-neutral pricing measure and not under
the real-world pricing measure. Thus, these deﬂation probabilities are not comparable to
those generated from macroeconomic sources. In contrast, the CLR modeling structure can
generate real-world probabilities that can be used for macroeconomic policy analysis.11
Aside from TIPS bonds, derivative contracts could be a separate source of ﬁnancial market
data from which to generate deﬂation probabilities. Notably, since it provides its purchaser
with protection when realized inﬂation exceeds a speciﬁed threshold, an inﬂation swap could
provide a reading on the market-based deﬂation probability on the day the contract was
struck.12 Since contracts are created every day at various possible maturities, a time-series
of deﬂation probabilities at various maturities could be generated. However, trading volume
on such swaps contracts is very limited in the U.S.13
5 Pricing Inﬂation Floors with Deﬂation Probabilities
TIPS coupons and principal have an asymmetrical indexation to the observed headline CPI
changes. The indexation in light of accumulated inﬂation leads to increases in the coupon
and principal payments accordingly.14 If at maturity the indexed principal payment is less
than the par amount at issuance due to accumulated deﬂation, the payment is increased back
to its par value. This embedded deﬂation ﬂoor protects the investor from declines in the
price level. Under normal inﬂationary circumstances, the option value of the TIPS deﬂation
ﬂoor is negligible since the probability of having negative accrued inﬂation compensation at
11The alternative approaches also generate only a single deﬂation probability at the forecast horizon deter-
mined by the maturity of the bonds under analysis. In contrast, the CLR model’s use of the entire yield curve
allows us to generate deﬂation probabilities for all horizons of interest.
12See Hinnerich (2008) for a discussion of the pricing of various forms of inﬂation-indexed derivatives.
Haubrich et al. (2008) use monthly inﬂation swap data in their joint model of nominal and real Treasury
rates.
13In addition, other inﬂation derivatives, such as inﬂation caps or ﬂoors that provide binary payments when
the observed inﬂation rate is above or below the contracted inﬂation rate, are said to be available and actively
traded. Given existing option pricing models, inﬂation-indexed derivatives could be used to extract market-
based deﬂation probabilities. However, aside from market liquidity issues, an important shortcoming of such
an approach is that the probabilities would again be solely based on the risk-neutral pricing measures.
14As described in G¨ urkaynak et al. (2010), the reference CPI values used in the adjustment have an
indexation lag since the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes price index values with a one-month lag; i.e., the
index for a given month is released in the middle of the subsequent month. The reference CPI is thus set to
be a weighted average of the CPI for the second and third months prior to the month of maturity.
17maturity is very small. However, at the peak of the ﬁnancial crisis in late 2008, neither the
perceived nor the priced probabilities of deﬂation were negligible. Under these circumstances,
a wedge developed between the prices of seasoned TIPS bonds with a signiﬁcant amount of
accrued inﬂation compensation and recently issued TIPS bonds that had no accumulated
inﬂation compensation and therefore were at the deﬂation ﬂoor upon issuance. Grishchenko
et al. (2010) used a monthly two-factor AF model to compute the value of the deﬂation option
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis and showed that its value peaked in mid-2009. In this section,
we use the contingent claim pricing derived by Duﬃe et al. (2000) within the AF modeling
framework described above to value this deﬂation protection option. This exercise provides a
relevant application of our deﬂation probabilities and, as we shall see, an independent check
on the overall ﬁt of the model.
We calculate the deﬂation options value by comparing under the risk-neutral pricing mea-
sure the prices of a newly issued TIPS bond without any accrued inﬂation compensation
and a seasoned TIPS bond with suﬃcient accrued inﬂation compensation. First, consider a
hypothetical seasoned TIPS bond with T years remaining to maturity that pays an annual
coupon C semi-annually. Assume this bond has accrued suﬃcient inﬂation compensation so
it is impossible to reach the deﬂation ﬂoor before maturity. The par-coupon bond satisfying















s ds] = 1. (4)
The ﬁrst term is the sum of the present value of the 2T coupon payments using the model’s
ﬁtted real yield curve at day t. The second term is the discounted value of the principal
payment. The coupon payment for this seasonal bond that solves this equation is denoted as
CS.
Next, consider a new TIPS bond with no accrued inﬂation compensation with T years to
maturity. Since the coupon payments are not protected against deﬂation, the diﬀerence is in




































The ﬁrst term is the same as before. The second term represents the present value of the
principal payment conditional on a positive net change in the price index over the bond’s
maturity; i.e.,
QT
Qt > 1. Under this condition, full inﬂation indexation applies, and the price
18change
QT
Qt is placed within the expectations operator and weighted by the probability of
accumulated inﬂation at time T. The third term represents the present value of the ﬂoored
TIPS principal conditional on accumulated net deﬂation; i.e., when the price level change is
below one,
QT
























































where the last term on the left-hand side represents the net present value of the deﬂation
protection of the principal in the TIPS contract.15 The par-coupon yield of a new hypothetical
TIPS bond that solves this equation is denoted as C0.
The diﬀerence between CS and C0 is a measure of the advantage of being at the inﬂation
adjustment ﬂoor for a newly issued TIPS bond. The black line in Figure 8 shows the diﬀerence
between the CS and C0 values that solve the pricing equations at the ﬁve-year maturity using
our real-time model estimates. Prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, the diﬀerences between
the two synthetic TIPS bond yields were quite near zero, but slightly negative. However,
the yield diﬀerences jumped during the ﬁnancial crisis, which is consistent with our model
implied deﬂation probabilities shown in Figure 3. Even by the end of our sample in December
2010, the spreads remained above 5 basis points, suggesting that deﬂation protection was still
of some value despite the fact that the model-implied deﬂation probabilities had reached
insigniﬁcant levels months before.16
Figure 8 also compares our model-based estimates to the observed yield diﬀerences between
pairs of comparable seasoned and recently issued TIPS bonds. The solid grey line represents
the yield diﬀerence between a seasoned ten-year TIPS bond with approximately ﬁve years
remaining to maturity and the most recently issued ﬁve-year TIPS bond.17 Since these pairs
15The appendix explains how these contingent conditional expectations are calculated within the CLR model
using the contingent claim pricing results of Duﬃe et al. (2000).
16This spread suggests that seasoned and newly issued TIPS bonds should not be pooled to construct real
yield curves, unless the prices of the recently issued TIPS are corrected for the value of the deﬂation protection.
17From January 3, 2005 to April 24, 2006, we use the 5-year TIPS that matured in April 2010 and the
10-year TIPS that matured in January 2010. From April 25, 2006 to April 23, 2007, we use the 5-year TIPS
with maturity in April 2011 and the 10-year TIPS with maturity in January 2011. From April 24, 2007 to
April 22, 2008, we use the 5-year TIPS with maturity in April 2012 and the 10-year TIPS with maturity in
July 2012. From April 23, 2008 to April 22, 2009, we use the 5-year TIPS with maturity in April 2013 and
the 10-year TIPS with maturity in July 2013. From April 23, 2009 to April 23, 2010, we use the 5-year TIPS
with maturity in April 2014 and the 10-year TIPS with maturity in July 2014. Since April 26, 2010, we use
































































Real−time model−based yield spread     
Yield spread between seasoned and new TIPS     
Figure 8: Value of the Deﬂation Protection Embedded in TIPS.
Illustration of the model-implied ﬁve-year par-coupon yield spread of a seasoned TIPS over a compa-
rable newly issued TIPS. Included are the spread in the yield-to-maturity as reported by Bloomberg
between the on-the-run pairs of seasoned and newly issued TIPS.
of TIPS bonds have similar remaining payment schedules and liquidity, their yield diﬀerence
should be primarily due to the value of the embedded deﬂation protection option. Our real-
time model estimates track the observed TIPS yield spread remarkably well, especially since
the individual TIPS spreads are not used directly in the model estimation. These results
provide further support for the model’s underlying deﬂation probability forecasts.18
6 Conclusion
The possibility of deﬂation has been an important risk factor for the Federal Reserve over the
past decade and, in light of the current low inﬂation environment, is likely to continue to be
so going forward. In this paper, we use a yields-only dynamic term structure model developed
by Christensen et al. (2010) to generate inﬂation expectations and corresponding deﬂation
the 5-year TIPS with maturity in April 2015 and the 10-year TIPS with maturity in July 2015.
18The model-based yield spreads are lower than the observed spreads. Incorporating stochastic volatility into
the model, as in Adrian and Wu (2010), might improve the pricing of the deﬂation option. We are pursuing
this issue in further work.
20probability forecasts that could be used directly for macroecnomic policy analysis and asset
pricing purposes. A key advantage of the model is that it can be updated daily with just
Treasury bond yields and used for real-time analysis, unlike macroeconomic analysis based
on lower-frequency data. The model’s deﬂation probabilities, both under the risk-neutral and
real-world pricing measures, are shown to correspond well with forecasts from macroeconomic
models, survey data, and other yields-only approaches in the literature. Finally, the model’s
ability to capture ﬂuctuations of the value of the TIPS embedded deﬂation protection option
provides further model validation and an example of its usefulness.
21Appendix
A). The Probability of Deﬂation in the CLR Model
The probability that the change in the price index is below a certain critical level q equals
the probability of the states of the world where
Qt+τ
Qt
≤ 1 + q.





s )ds ≤ ln(1 + q).











s −αRSs)ds ⇒ dY0,t = (LN
t +(1−αR)St−LR
t )dt.
In general, the real-world P-dynamics of the state variables Xt are given by
dXt = KP(θP − Xt)dt + ΣdWP
t .
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σ1 0 0 0 0
0 σ2 0 0 0
0 0 σ3 0 0
0 0 0 σ4 0












































where Z0,t = (LN
t ,St,Ct,LR
t ,Y0,t) represents the augmented state vector.
This is a system of Gaussian state variables, and all we need to describe its distributional
properties is to calculate the conditional mean vector and covariance matrix. If we deﬁne
mP(0,t) = EP[Z0,t|F0], it follows from Duﬃe (1996), p. 293, that the vector of conditional
22means is given by the solution to the following system of ODEs:
dmP(0,t)
dt















































































































According to the same source, the conditional covariance matrix can be calculated as
dV P(t)
dt
= bPV P(t) + V P(t)(bP)′ + ΣΣ
′, V P(0) = 0,








σ1 0 0 0 0
0 σ2 0 0 0
0 0 σ3 0 0
0 0 0 σ4 0








We solve both systems of ODEs with a standard fourth-order, Runge-Kutta method. Given
solutions for mP
0,t and V P






































B). Calculation of the NPV of the TIPS Principal Deﬂation Protection
In general, we are interested in ﬁnding the net present value (NPV) of terminal payoﬀs
from TIPS bonds contingent on the cumulated inﬂation being below some critical value q;


























Thus, the states of the world of interest are characterized by
QT
Qt





s )ds ≤ ln(1 + q).
To price these terminal principal payments, we need the dynamics of the state variables under
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0 λ −λ 0 0
0 0 λ 0 0
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In order to calculate ψ1(B,t,T) and ψ2(B,t,T), we summarize the risk-neutral dynamics by












0 0 0 0 0
0 λ −λ 0 0
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From Duﬃe et al. (2000), it follows that
ψ1(B,t,T) = exp(Bψ1(t,T)′Zt,t + Aψ1(t,T)),
24where Bψ1(t,T) and Aψ1(t,T) are the solutions to the following system of ODEs:
dBψ1(t,T)
dt









′Bψ1(t,T)Bψ1(t,T)′Σ)j,j, Aψ1(T,T) = 0.
This system of ODEs can be solved analytically, and the solution is provided in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1:
If the state variables are given by Zt,T = (LN
t ,St,Ct,LR
t ,Yt,T) and the real instantaneous
risk-free rate is given by rR





























































19The calculations leading to this result are available upon request.
20As we will see later, we need to evaluate Aψ1(t,T) (and Aψ2(t,T) below) at B
5
= 0. Since the analytical
Aψi(t,T)-functions are not well-deﬁned in this case (while the underlying ODEs obviously are), we approximate































































































































































































Using a similar approach, it holds that
ψ2(B,t,T) = exp(Bψ2(t,T)′Zt,t + Aψ2(t,T)),
where Bψ2(t,T) and Aψ2(t,T) are the solutions to the following system of ODEs
dBψ2(t,T)
dt








(Σ′Bψ2(t,T)Bψ2(t,T)′Σ)j,j, Aψ2(T,T) = 0.
This system can also be solved analytically, and the solution is provided in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2:
If the state variables are given by Zt,T = (LN
t ,St,Ct,LR
t ,Yt,T) and the nominal instanta-
neous risk-free rate is given by rN
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With these results at our disposal, we can turn our attention to the pricing of the deﬂation





















































s )ds ≤ ln(1 + q),





















and z = ln(1 + q).


























v that need to be integrated in
order to calculate the NPV of the TIPS deﬂation protection typically have converged to zero
for values of v above 500. Thus, we approximate the inﬁnite integral in the pricing formulas
by capping v at 1000 to err on the side of conservatism and use a step size of ∆v = 0.01 in
the numerical approximation, which is suﬃcient since the functions are clearly smooth.
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